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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines, from both theoretical and policy perspectives,
a limited but important aspect of the patent system: its role and operation
in supplying global demand for widely recognized health needs. It
concludes that although the patent system is without peer in routing
resources to the creation of the technological needs of modern societies,
some aspects of that system operate better than others. In this connection,
the paper directs attention to ways in which the patent system may
produce less-than-optimum results in the markets served by the
pharmaceutical industry as well as to related issues about how research
on the world’s widely recognized health needs should be funded.
The patent system, once largely ignored by non-specialists, has
recently been receiving increasing attention from legal academics,
economists, and policy makers. These analysts have focused both upon
the system’s domestic effects and upon its effects in the global economy.
The creation, in the 1980s, of the Federal Court of Appeals with oversight
over patent litigation,1 brought renewed strength to the domestic patent
system. Partly as a result of this reform, academic examinations of the
system, which began in earnest in the 1960s, have increased dramatically.
The negotiation of the World Trade Agreement in 1994 brought all of
intellectual property into the world trading system through the ancillary
TRIPS agreement,2 subjecting it to new critiques from those sensitive to
the impact of this property system upon the publics of the world’s less
developed regions.
Although so
me economists have been skeptical about the impact of
the patent system in generating new technology,3 others have recognized
its potency. Perhaps Kenneth Arrow’s 1961 inquiry into the differing
innovation incentives found in concentrated and competitive markets4
provided the initial spark for the substantial attention that the patent
1

Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 36 (1982) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000).
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994,
Legal Instruments of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81 (TRIPS Agreement).
3 See C.T, TAYLOR & Z. A. SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM
(1973); Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173,
176 (1986).
4 Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY (1962).
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system has received from economists. Later in that decade, William
Nordhaus moved theoretical research a giant step forward with the
publication of his seminal work on the economics of the patent system,5 a
work that stimulated an immense amount of analytical attention to the
patent system and its operation. Edmund Kitch provoked the interest of
legal scholars when, in the 1970s, he showed us how the patent system
operates as a vehicle for staking out a particular area of technology for
exclusive development,6 a condition often critical to the investment of
needed resources. Louis Kaplow drew the attention of the legal
community to the costs and benefits of the patent system in his important
1984 work comparing the welfare effects of antitrust and patent market
restraints.7 Robert Merges took the lead in examining the operation of the
patent system in a series of articles in the early 1990s.8 Since Merges’
pioneering work, legal scholars have joined others in a flood of works
examining the patent system and its operation. Recently Mark Lemley and
my colleague Dan Burk have provided a major contribution to this
research with an examination of how the patent system operates in
different industries.9 Throughout this period, policy makers were
generating new legislative modifications to the patent system. In the
1970s, congressional concern about the impact of time-consuming FDA
review of new drug applications resulted in legislative extensions of the
patent term for pharmaceutical companies that had lost initial years of
patent protection to that review.10 In the 1980s policy makers focused
upon the patent system as an agent for economic rejuvenation, with the
result that Congress created the Federal Court of Appeals.11 And in the
1990s, Congress approved the NAFTA and WTO agreements that
provided new strength to patents and other intellectual property rights

5

WILLIAM NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH AND WELFARE, ch. 5 (1969).
See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265
(1977).
7 Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813
(1984).
8 Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 21
(1992); Robert Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990); Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards:
Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803 (1988).
9 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003).
10 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b-68c, 70b, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301
note, 355, 360cc, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2000).
11 See note 1 supra.
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throughout North America and the world.12
Currently the operation of the patent system is on the forefront of
controversies, both domestic and international, about its effects upon
pricing and exclusion in the pharmaceutical industry. We allow patentees
to exercise exclusive rights—rights that may sometimes be equivalent to
monopolies—over their inventions for a term of years precisely to create
incentives to invent. And yet users of pharmaceuticals—especially the
elderly—have complained so much about high pharmaceutical prices that
Congress has legislatively reformed the Medicare Act to subsidize the
purchase of pharmaceuticals.13 The public policies that foster monopoly
pricing in the patent law and those that subsidize purchasing in the
amended Medicare Act appear to be in some tension. These Congressional
actions are in further tension with the actions of Canadian and European
regulatory schemes that are designed to place upward limits on
pharmaceutical prices. They are in even greater tension with strongly held
beliefs of third-world governments and their publics that the patent
sy
stems of the United States and other Western nations are depriving the
world’s poor of essential medications
This paper addresses the broad interplay between the incentive
structure of the patent system and that system’s social benefits and costs,
viewed both on a national scale and, to a significant extent, on an
international one. The paper examines the relation of private and social
value to investment (and thus upon the basic economics of the system)
with a view to identifying the system’s weaknesses. It draws heavily from
Louis Kaplow who developed a way of conceptualizing the marginal
social costs and benefits of the patent system. It also draws from Kenneth
Arrow who described incentives for innovation in competitive and
monopoly contexts.
The paper compares the operation of the incentive structure of the
patent system with other mechanisms for fostering inventive activity, as
12

Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994); North
American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057
(1993).
13 Pub. L. 108-173 (2003). Section 101 of the legislation, inter alia, adds subsidization of
prescription-drug benefits to the Medicare program. See 18 U.S.C. § 1860D-2(b), as
added by P.L. 108-173. The popular press is paying increasing attention to high drug
prices in the United States vis-à-vis Canada and other developed nations. See, e.g., Roger
Parloff, The New Drug War, FORTUNE, Mar. 8, 2004, at 144; Why We Pay so Much for Drugs,
TIME, Feb. 2, 2004 at 4; Josh Benson, Drugged, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 7, 2003, at 12.
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important background for its ultimate focus upon the relationship
between the patent system and the generation of life-saving drugs.
Although the paper readily concedes the general superiority of the patent
system for eliciting inventive activity, the paper suggests that its
superiority may not extend throughout the entire range of potential
inventive activity. Indeed, the paper raises the question as to whether the
patent system is superior in the context of pharmaceutical products that
play (or could play) critical roles in the control of certain diseases or other
disabilities.
The paper builds on the Kaplow perspective for assessing social
costs and benefits. In so doing it attempts to articulate a perspective for
carrying on the debate about the operation of the patent system and its
application to pharmaceutical research. Drawing from that perspective,
the paper raises at least two important policy issues especially connected
with the marketing of pharmaceutical products and the fostering of
pharmaceutical research. First, it raises the issue of price discrimination.
Are laws, customs, or other practices discouraging or otherwise impeding
the very price discrimination that could reduce deadweight loss and
thereby increase social welfare? Second, when should public policy foster
inventive activity through means other than the patent system?
Part II of the article reviews the standard incentive theory
underlying the patent system. It summarizes the theory under which the
patent law is said to harness the incentives of the inventor for the benefit
of society. Part III examines the incentive structure, with particular
emphasis upon two factors that affect the profitability of that research: (1)
the probabilities that the firm undertaking the research will succeed in
obtaining a patent for a commercially valuable result; and (2) the effects of
the time lag between the period in which funds are committed to research
and the period in which the results of that research produces revenue.
Part IV employs the marginal analysis developed by Louis Kaplow to
sketch out a schema for balancing social benefits against social costs, a
schema that initially employs a linear analysis. Part IV also introduces the
time dimension discussed in Part III into the analysis of social costs and
benefits, concluding that as the patent term increases the rate of increase
of social benefits slows while the rate of increase of social costs increases.
Finally Part IV expands its schema by dropping the linear constraint from
its model. With that modification, the model reveals that the
proportionality between social benefit and cost that would accompany a
linear model can be transformed, at least in theory, into a vastly
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disproportionate relationship. Part V then raises the question of whether
price discrimination can remedy these welfare problems. Part VI attacks
the welfare problem from another angle. It inquires whether there may be
a class of new pharmaceutical products for which financing schemes other
than the patent system would better maximize aggregate welfare.
II. PATENT THEORY, MARKET FAILURE, ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
AND SOCIAL WELFARE: THE BEGINNINGS OF ANALYSIS

A. In General.
The theory of patent law is straightforward. Society benefits from
new technology. Yet in the absence of patent protection, invention would
often go unrewarded. Unless a portion of this newly created economic
value can be captured by its inventor, there is no incentive to innovate.
Indeed, in certain cases there would be a negative incentive: invention
often requires the expenditure of substantial resources in research and
experimentation. This failure of the market to supply the incentive to
invent is a result of a crucial absence of property rights.
When people provide goods and services, the property rights
regime enables them to capture the economic value which they create by
providing these goods and services. A producer or merchant owns the
goods which are produced or provided. This enables him to trade the
goods for compensation. In a similar way a service provider ensures that it
provides services only on condition of being paid. The common-law
property regime requires augmentation in those circumstances in which
property rights do not provide a means for an inventor to capture at least
a portion of the economic value which she has created. This void in the
common law is filled by the patent law.
To an inventor who can meet its stringent standards, the patent law
confers an exclusive right to make, use or sell the invention for a twentyyear period, commencing with the date on which the inventor files his
patent application. Since the patent office normally takes one to three
years in evaluating the patent and/or in negotiating with the patentee
over the scope of his claims, the effective legal term may be more like
seventeen years. For products like pharmaceuticals that require regulatory
approval before marketing can begin, the effective period of protection
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may be further reduced. The inventor’s “reward”, as it is sometimes
called, consists in his exploitation of these exclusive rights. Her reward is
thus determined directly by the receptivity of the market to her product. If
the product is in high demand, then she is likely to profit handsomely. Yet
however ingenious the invention, there is little or no reward to the
inventor unless buyers appreciate it and are willing to pay for it.
This dependence upon the combination of the exclusive rights
conferred by the patent law with the incentives of the market has both
positive and negative effects. On the positive side, the system ensures that
incentives are directed towards the generation of products that people
want. On the negative side, the patent system does not provide incentives
for products for which there is a social need but no economic demand,
such as drugs for diseases (like sleeping sickness) that primarily affect
populations with little purchasing power. The patent system, almost by
definition, also does not work to stimulate primary research. In these
latter areas (needs of the poor, primary research) alternative systems of
stimulating research and/or invention, such as by government funding14
or by post-hoc government rewards are, or may be, necessary.15 The
patent system also generates inefficiencies: the patentee’s exclusive rights
permit it to charge supra-competitive prices for the patented product,
with the result that some potential customers who value the invention at
more than its cost of production but at less than the price charged by the
patentee go unserved. In the language of economists, this is a deadweight
loss: a loss to society resulting from a misallocation of resources.
Because the patent system operates through harnessing marketbased incentives, the structure of those incentives bears examination. It is
the expected value of the patented invention that provides the incentive to
undertake the research and development that ultimately produces it.
Before a potential inventor commits an investment to research and
development activities, it assesses the expected profit from that
investment. And, of course, it compares that expected profit with expected

14

Most basic research is funded by the federal government. SEE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
2001 508 (Table no. 769)
15 Numerous suggestions have been made for a reward system of stimulating research.
The focus of many of these proposals has been the elimination of the dead-weight loss
problem. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115,
122-27, 169 (2003); Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual
Property Rights, 44 J. LAW & ECON. 525, 529 (2001).
THE UNITED STATES:
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returns from alternative investments.
B. The Patent System as an Adjunct to the Market
Although the patent system is not the only means available for
fostering invention, it possesses certain characteristics that enable it to
mesh with the market more or less seamlessly. We observed earlier that
the patent system solves a market failure: the absence, in the traditional
property regime, of rights over inventions means that the economic
incentives that elsewhere foster productive behavior would not (in the
absence of the patent system) foster inventive behavior. By providing
these missing rights, the patent system broadens the reach of the market,
endowing it with a major responsibility for stimulating invention in both
end products and technology.
It is in this augmentation of market mechanisms that the
advantages and disadvantages of the patent system lie. By providing
missing property rights and relying upon the market to provide both the
inventive stimulus and ultimate reward, the patent system maximizes the
extent to which new inventive activity will be directed to the needs and
wants that society most values (as measured by market demand) and
minimizes the extent to which resources will be directed to unwanted
goods and services. Throughout the operation of the patent system, the
market plays the key role. Potential inventors look to the market for clues
as to what kinds of products are likely to be rewarded. They gear their
efforts according to the clues that the market provides. And the extent to
which they are in fact rewarded for their inventive activity is determined
by the market. The objective forces of the market thus perform critical
roles in directing the course of inventive activity. Because no other
decision-making mechanism can match the market’s predictive abilities or
its ability to continually reassess and reevaluate, the patent system, which
incorporates these market mechanisms, partakes of these advantages. The
superiority of the patent system over alternative means of fostering
inventive activity thus lies in its ability to harness the powerful forces of
the market to its ends. Yet it is also this attachment of the patent system to
market mechanisms that account for its disadvantages.
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C. Classes of Inventions and the Loci of the Patent System’s Advantages
and Disadvantages.
In a well-known paper of 1962, Kenneth Arrow divided inventions
into two classes.16 In the first class are innovations which reduce
production costs substantially. In the second class are innovations which
reduce costs in lesser amounts. The first class embraces innovations which
lower cost so much that—were the market to be in control of a
monopolist—that monopolist would set the post-innovation profitmaximizing price below the level of the old unit production cost. The
second class consists of other cost-reducing innovations. This classification
of inventions worked well for Arrow’s paper which sought to distinguish
the profit generated by invention in a monopoly marketplace from that
generated by invention in a competitive marketplace, and his classification
has has been followed by others. Nordhaus, for example, employed that
classification, and called the first class “drastic” inventions. Arrow’s
classification also works for this paper. Drawing from (and somewhat
modifying) traditional legal terminology, this paper calls these two classes
of inventions “pioneer” inventions17 and “improvement” inventions.
The patent system probably operates in its least controversial mode
in fostering improvement-type inventions. Here the ratio of dead-weight
loss to profit is minimized. Minimizing this ratio mutes controversy over
the optimum length of the patent term in the context of improvement-type
inventions. And the fostering of improvement-type inventions shows the
operation of the patent system at its best. The benefits of the system’s
decentralized incentive structure ensure that adequate attention is
directed to improvements of technologies at levels that fall below the
threshold of public visibility but which in the aggregate contribute
significantly to the improvement of society’s productive efficiencies.
Probably most patent activity is concerned with improvement-type
inventions. If so, then most patent activity is concentrated where it raises
few controversial issues about social costs and benefits.
Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY (1962).
17 Cf. Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 561-62 (1898) (“This word
[pioneer invention] . . . is commonly understood to denote a patent covering a function
never before performed, a wholly novel device, or one of such novelty and importance as
to mark a distinct step in the progress of the art, as distinguished from a mere
improvement or perfection of what had gone before.”) In using the term “pioneer
invention” to refer to a major invention in the Arrow sense, the text is employing that
term in a related, but slightly different, sense from that used by the courts.
16Kenneth
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The patent system’s most apparent disadvantages involve the
deadweight losses that the system generates by conferring market power
on patentees. These losses may be a part of a system that generates
inventive activity, but they are nonetheless a social cost. Pioneer
inventions are likely to generate higher ratios of deadweight loss to profit
than improvement-type inventions. In some cases, the ratio of deadweight
loss to profit might be very high. As a result pioneer inventions better
raise issues about the system’s social costs and benefits. Of course, the
deadweight loss generated by pioneer inventions is also a measure of the
social value created by these inventions. Society wants and needs pioneer
inventions. The questions are whether patent terms are too long and
whether these inventions can be generated with a lesser degree of
deadweight loss.
The public is probably most conscious of patentee market power
over new pharmaceutical products. Because pharmaceuticals are one of
the few places where a single patent covers an entire product,18 they may
be less subject to pricing constraints than other inventions that are
improvements to machines or processes and for which pre-existing
technologies are ready substitutes. The media has reported extensive
public concern over what are perceived as unduly high price levels for
patented pharmaceuticals, a concern to which Congress has recently
responded. Beyond these domestic welfare and distributional issues,
however, the pricing of patented pharmaceutical products appears to
create extensive deadweight losses in third-world nations. These real and
perceived disadvantages of the patent system, as it operates in the
pharmaceutical industry, may be accompanied by some weakening of the
informational advantages that the system draws from its close interaction
with the market. The system’s ability to harness market-supplied
information that is one of its major advantages may be less so with certain
kinds of pharmaceutical products, where in the area of critical and lifeSee Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1590 (2003):
In some industries, such as chemistry and pharmaceuticals, a single
patent normally covers a single product. Much conventional wisdom in
the patent system is built on the unstated assumption of such a one-toone correspondence. . . . Such a correspondence is the exception rather
than the rule, however. Machines of even moderate complexity are
composed of many different pieces, and each of these components can
itself be the subject of one or more patents.
See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of
Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1738 (2003).
18
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saving drugs, needs are widely recognized. Indeed, the patent system’s
close interaction with the market explains why pharmaceutical companies
do not develop drugs for the cure of diseases afflicting poor nations. Such
products would not be profitable. None of these remarks is meant to say
that the patent system does not work in this industry or that it works
particularly badly. Neither is it to say that social costs outweigh benefits in
the generation of new pharmaceuticals. Rather, it is merely to point out
that in this area the patent system’s advantages appear less strong than
they do in other areas. These apparent weaknesses in the way the system
operates in pharmaceutical markets are discussed below. The article then
discusses means for minimizing those weaknesses.
III. THE INCENTIVE EFFECTS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE INVENTOR:
WHERE SOCIAL BENEFIT MEETS PRIVATE INCENTIVE19
A firm contemplating research to develop a new product
necessarily investigates whether the research is likely to succeed and
whether the revenues that the product generates will be likely to cover its
costs and to product a profit. The ordinary lag between the time when a
firm introduces a new product and the time when its competitors bring
rival products to market provides a window for the innovating firm to
capture much of the economic value that it has created. That period of de
facto exclusivity is sufficient to support modest research and
development. The patent system provides legally protected exclusivity for
the longer periods necessary to justify the larger investments that may be
necessary to design highly innovative products.
Thus a firm contemplating a large research investment considers,
first, the chances that its research will succeed. Second, it considers the
probabilities that it (rather than one of its rivals that may also be
conducting research) will be able to obtain a patent on the product. Third,
it assesses the amount of expected revenue that the product is likely to
generate and the costs that it will incur in producing the product.

19

The discussion in this and the next Part considers the value of the patented invention.
We distinguish between the aggregate social value of the invention and the private value
to the inventor. In the next Part, we consider the social value of invention. Here, because
we are interested in the incentive effects of the patent system, we are concerned with the
private value to the inventor.
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A. The Probability of Success
A potential innovator must, of course, balance the amount of its
research and development costs and its probability of successfully
developing the innovation against the value of the innovation. In addition,
it must also weigh the risk that a rival will also succeed in developing the
invention. Professor Robert Merges breaks the decision about committing
funds to research into two stages. In the first stage, the inventor decides
whether to undertake preliminary experimentation on an invention. In the
second stage, the inventor decides whether to develop the invention.20 As
Merges points out, this model captures some of the complexity of the real
world: The results of the preliminary experimentation in the first stages
provide information that will recast the probabilities of success that the
inventor weighs when deciding whether to proceed into the second stage.
Indeed, an inventor is continually facing new decisions with increasing
amounts of information as the project proceeds. Thus, Merges’ analysis
fits nicely with a third stage of the development process identified by
Edmund Kitch.21 In Kitch’s model, the issuance of a patent is treated as
tantamount to staking out an area for commercial development. In this
post-patent stage, the inventor has solved the basic technology problem
and has won the race to the patent office. At this late stage, an inventor
deciding whether to go forward must weigh the costs of commercial
development against his estimate of commercial success.22
Let’s consider the probability of success in the quest to develop the
innovation. If only one firm is in the research race, then that firm
undertakes the research if the value of the anticipated product times the
probability of successfully developing it is greater than the cost of the
required investment in r&d.23 But if two firms decide to undertake
Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 21
(1992).
21 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265
(1977).
22 The present discussion collapses the two stages identified by Merges for ease in
presentation. Moreover, it also combines inventor’s assessments about the probabilities
of succeeding in his quest for a patented invention with his assessments of succeeding in
the race to the patent office. Combining these several issues confronting an inventor here
is not problematic so long as we remember that we are employing a simplifying model of
a process that in real life involves a series of decisions, each of which draws upon a body
of information that is continually being augmented.
23 The analysis employed in this and the following footnotes is drawn from OZ SHY,
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 224-25 (1995). Let: V = the private value of the invention; I =
the anticipated cost of research and development; ; " [" < 1] = the probability of technical
20
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investment in similar r&d, the dimensions of the problem change. If one
firm develops the product and the second firm does not, the successful
firm acquires the entire value of the product.24 But it is possible that both
firms may succeed technologically but only one of them wins the race to
the patent office and thereby captures the potential economic value of the
product. Indeed, regardless of how many firms succeed technologically,
only one will receive the patent.25
The expected value of product development must take into account
both situations. Since only one firm can win the patent race, the
probability of succeeding overall, i.e., the probability of both developing
the technology and receiving the patent, is the multiple of the two
probabilities. (i.e. probability of developing the technology x probability
of receiving the patent). Accordingly, the ex ante expected profit for each
firm is discounted by both probabilities. Of course, any number of firms
may enter the research-and-innovation race. If we assume that each of the
successful innovators has an equal chance to obtain a patent, then the
expected value of the patent becomes the value of the innovation divided
by the number of successful innovators. As the number of firms focusing
success; 1 - " = the probability of failure. If only one firm seeks to develop the product,
then it will undertake the investment if its expected profit (B) is "V > I. Note that V is
less than the social value of the invention, which includes consumer as well as producer
surplus. V here is the capitalized value of producer surplus.
24 The probability that one firm develops the product and the second firm does not is: "(1
- ").
25 It is necessary to modify Shy’s analysis somewhat when we deal with the probability
that both firms succeed technologically, but only one firm succeeds in obtaining the
patent. In the two-firm case discussed by Shy, the two share the product’s value when
both succeed. See id., at 224, Assumption 9.1. This, of course, cannot be literally true. If
the product is patentable, the first inventor captures the entire value of the invention.
Shy’s treatment is acceptable for analytical purposes, however, because treating the rival
firms as sharing the value of the invention is tantamount to according each of the rival
firms an equal probability of winning the race to the patent office. The probability of this
result is: "2. The expected value of product development must take into account both
situations. Accordingly, the expected profit for each firm is: B = "(1 - ")V + "2V/2. Each
firm will undertake the requisite r&d if "(1 - ")V + "2V/2 > I, or equivalently if "(2 - ")V/2
> I.25 Again, analysis shows that in areas of high cost r&d, firms will be increasingly
reluctant to undertake r&d as the number of equally competent rivals in the research race
grows. With three firms the potential payoff is: B = "(1 - ")2V + 2"2(1 - ")V/2 + "3V/3.
Each firm will undertake the requisite r&d if: "(1 - ")2V + 2"2(1 - ")V/2 + "3V/3 > I. In its
more generalized form, the expected profit for each firm doing research for product
development grows in complexity:
B=

n

3
I=1

(n-1)!
ai (1-")n-I V/I
(I-1)! (n-I)!
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their efforts on developing the same innovation increases, the lower is the
chance of success for any one firm. Indeed, as the number of firms in the
patent race increases, the expected value of the invention to any one of
them approaches zero.26
B. Returns Discounted to Present Value.
The expected profit that is salient to the inventor is, of course, the
discounted present value of the expected future returns. As a result, the
more distant are the future revenues, the lower is their contribution to the
incentive structure of the patent system.
1. Incentives and Discounted Future Revenues.
Because the expected profit is realized over a period that begins
only after the invention is fit for commercial exploitation, the comparison
of expected profit to investment—as noted above—necessarily is a
comparison of present costs with future earnings. Earnings necessarily are
weighted less than the research costs that generate them because the
former must be discounted to present value while the latter do not.
Moreover, the anticipated returns must be adjusted in several
ways. We have already noted that they must be adjusted for the estimated
probabilities of technological success as well as for the probabilities that
technological success may be rendered moot by others winning the race to
the patent office.
In this section, we focus upon the value of the anticipated returns.
At the stage at which the investment commitment is made, the present
value of the anticipated returns is at its lowest. Since the research and
development work has not yet begun, the period in which the anticipated
returns are generated is still some time away. There can be no returns
until the invention is produced and in form for commercial use. Thus if
the research and development period takes, say, three years, then the first
returns will not begin until then. Thus, in that case, the first year’s
anticipated returns must be discounted for that three year wait. And, of
course, the returns generated in each year of the patent term have to be
discounted accordingly. (If the patent application is filed three years after
26

See note 25 supra.
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the commencement of research and the product is immediately marketed,
the returns to the investor (viewed from the date of his investment) from
each year of the 20 year patent term would have to be discounted from 3 to 23
years).
Kitch’s focus upon patent rights as means of staking out a
technology for commercial development27 calls our attention to the fact
that the early years of the patent term may not be usable for commercial
exploitation. However long this post-patent period of development
extends, it consumes some of the protected patent period, narrowing
further the period of return on investment.28 Modifying the above
example to take account of a period of development, we might have a
three-year period of research followed by filing of a patent application,
which is then followed, say, by a two-year period of development. Since
the 20-year patent term begins with the filing of the patent application, the
two-year development period in the example reduces the commerciallyrelevant protected term to 18 years. So, in such a case, the first return
would be a full five years distant from the commencement of investment.
This problem became acute in the pharmaceutical industry after Congress
required new drugs to be “effective” as well as “safe.” The new
effectiveness requirement added to the delay before a patented drug could
be marketed, as more extensive testing was needed before the FDA could
approve its marketing. Congress then authorized extensions of the patent
term to compensate for regulatory delay, but the extensions do not fully
compensate for those delays.
Finally, it should be observed that it may take time for potential
customers to recognize the value of a new product and to adjust their
purchases accordingly. A producer generally plans a promotional strategy
with which to acquaint potential purchasers about the characteristics of a
new product. As a result the sales volume of a new product may increase
over a period of years. Revenue, accordingly, may be lower in the early
years in which it is marketed than in later ones.

See Edmund W. Kitch, supra note 21.
As observed above, Merges’ model identifies a first stage involving preliminary
experimentation, followed by a second stage in which the inventive work is pursued.
Merges, supra note 20. In this second stage, the risks are whether the technology can be
developed at all and whether a rival will do it first. The goal of the latter stage is
patentability, independent of commercial viability. In Kitch’s third stage, the risk is solely
with whether the technology can be raised to a level of commercial viability. The threat
from rivals has been avoided by the patent obtained at the end of stage one.

27
28
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2. The Inventor’s Perspective Again.
Implicit in the discussion above are the economics underlying the
decision of the inventor about whether to undertake an investment in
innovation. The basic economic questions are whether the value of the
patented invention is expected (1) to exceed the cost of the investment and
(2) to produce a return superior to alternative investments. In making
these comparisons, the prospective investor necessarily compares the
present cost (the up-front investment) with future returns, returns that
must be discounted both for their uncertainty and their future dates.
Let’s illustrate these matters using a stylized example. Suppose we
estimate the chances of successfully developing a new product (let’s call it
a widget) at 80%. Then we should discount our projected profits by 80%.
Suppose further that we know that three of our rivals are attempting to
develop this product. The first to succeed will receive a patent and block
the others from the widget market. Since we and our three rivals are
starting out about the same time and with approximately the same
resources, our chances of developing the product first would appear to be
one in four, or 25%. Thus, on this assessment, we have a 25% of 80%
chance of success, or an overall probability of success of 20%. On these
probabilities, unless the expected return is extremely high and we are
high-risk takers, we should probably look for an alternative line of
research and development.
Let’s add a new element. Our own prior research gives us an
advantage unknown to the others. As a result, we have concluded that we
have a 90% chance of developing the product first. Now our aggregate
probability of success is 90% of 80%, or 72%. The project, of course, is
risky, but if the expected returns are sufficiently high, then they can justify
the risk. Those returns must be discounted to 72% of their expected value
in order to compare them with our investment and alternative
investments. (Alternative investments, of course, also have to be
discounted for risk).
Let’s make some additional simple assumptions assume for
illustrative purposes. We expect that our invention will generate revenues
(in excess of production costs) of $1,000,000 per year. Over a twenty-year
patent term, the total return would be $20,000,000. As we have noted,
however, the ex ante expected value of the patented invention is
substantially less than $20,000,000. Ignoring, for the moment, the time
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required for research and development, that $20,000,000 in future earnings
would have to be discounted to present value. Let’s assume that we
recognize earnings at the end of each of the twenty years of the patent
period. Then the $1,000,000 for the first year is discounted by the interest
rate. [$1,000,000/(1+r)], where r is the rate of interest.] The $1,000,000 for
the second is discounted by the interest for years one and two.
[$1,000,000/(1+r)2]. And so on. The present value of the $20,000,000 in
future earnings thus is:
20

3$1,000,000/(1+r)i
i=1

At an interest rate of 5%, the $20,000,000 in future revenues would have a
present value of $13,850,320. So the present value of these revenues is
only about 69% of their nominal dollar amount. We also must discount
the $13,850,320 for risk. Recalling that we had an estimated 72%
probability of succeeding in actually acquiring the invention, the value of
the expected invention is $9,972,230. That is not quite 50% of the total
expected future $20,000,000, expressed in nominal dollars. If the
investment required to develop the product is substantially less than the
$9,972,230, then it would provide a positive profit.
Suppose the required investment is $5,000,000. Then, on these
figures, the investment would generate a profit of $4,972,230 over a
twenty year period. The attractiveness of that return depends upon its
alternatives. Five million dollars invested at 6% over a twenty year period
would produce $19,098,748, or a net profit of $14,098,748 in nominal
dollars or $5,054,202 in present value. Thus in this case, the pursuit of the
invention does not appear especially attractive as an investment. An
alternative disposition of the $5,000,000 at 1% over the going interest rate
would be more profitable.
Thus the incentive structure of the patent system requires that we
assess the expected return in the light of the investment necessary to
generate that return. To make that assessment, future revenues must be
discounted to present value and be further discounted for risk. Such
discounting is standard practice for investors, considering whether or not
to undertake a particular investment or in selecting a particular
investment from a range of alternatives. Yet the patent system is dedicated
to generating significant advances: No patent can be issued unless the
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invention is “nonobvious,”29 a phrase meaning beyond the knowledge
and abilities of a competent professional in the field. The system itself thus
courts the risk that the purported inventor will not be able to exceed the
capabilities of his or her peers. In the most successful inventions, the risk
factor will be reflected in the high profits which those inventions
command. And the reliance of the patent system upon incentives
generated by twenty-year period of exclusive rights, also exacerbates the
difference between the return seen by observers (the dollar return at the
moment of the observation) and the incentive to the inventor (that return
discounted to its ex ante value). As we will see below, these differences
between the ex post and ex ante values are relevant in a variety of ways to
the assessment of the system’s private and social costs and benefits.
IV. EXPLORING SOCIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS
A. The Arrow Analysis: Different Values in Different Market Structures.
Arrow (who divided inventions into two categories30) concluded
that for pioneer inventions an innovator would set a royalty equal to a
monopoly return. This would be true regardless of the industry market
structure. Despite the monopoly return to the inventor, the public would
incur an immediate benefit because the large cost savings would press
prices downward, below the level that they were prior to the invention.
This easily seen in figure 1 below. Let’s assume that the product was
initially produced in a competitive market where the cost and price are
represented by the line PP and the output is XX. The invention reduces
costs to the level of c. Now the inventor licenses the invention at a per unit
royalty equal to the vertical distance between c and p. Consumer surplus
is the area under the demand curve down to P, i.e., it is the area within the
triangle DAP, albeit the contribution to consumer surplus of the invention
is not the entire area of the triangle DAP but the lesser area of the
trapezoid PP-Z-A-P. Similarly, the social benefit produced by the
invention is not the area of the triangle DCG, but the trapezoid PP-Z-A-BC. The inefficiency generated by the patent-system is represented by the
triangle AGB, representing deadweight loss, i.e., the demands of those
unsatisfied customers who value the product more than its production
29

The patent act requires that an invention pass the threshold of obviousness. That is, the
difference between the invention and the prior art must not be obvious to a person
skilled in the art pertaining to the subject matter of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
30 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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cost (0c) but less than the patentee’s price (0p).
The second or “improvement” category requires some discussion.
Arrow was interested in how market structure affected the incentives to
innovate. Although his focus differs from that of the present paper, his
analysis is useful for exploring the economic effects of an invention of the
improvement type. Arrow observed that in the case of an improvement,
the inventor would set the royalty in the full amount of the per-unit cost
savings, thereby capturing the entire cost savings for itself. But the
revenues earned would differ depending upon the market structure in
which the invention was employed. In a competitive market, the royalty
would equal the unit cost savings multiplied by the industry output
immediately prior to the deployment of the invention. In a monopoly
marketplace, the inventor’s return would be less, because the value of the
invention would be limited to the unit cost savings multiplied by the
smaller monopoly output. The critical element in Arrow’s analysis of
improvement patents, for our purposes, is the constraint that the
preexisting technology exerts upon the patentee’s pricing power. We
examine that constraint below.

Figure 2 below depicts the Arrow hypothesis in diagrammatic
form. In the diagram, the monopolist’s initial profit is represented by the
rectangle formed by the horizontal line pm1 on the top, the horizontal line
c1 on the bottom, the (vertical) 0 axis on the left side, and the vertical xm1
intersect on the right side (or x1(pm1 – c1)). The monopolist’s postinnovation profit is represented by the rectangle formed by the horizontal
line pm2 on the top, the horizontal line c2 on the bottom, the (vertical) 0
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axis on the left and the vertical xm2 intersect on the right (or xm2(pm2 – c2)).
The increment to the monopolist’s profits resulting from the innovation,
accordingly, is the difference between these two amounts. Another way
the difference in monopoly profits is shown in the diagram is in the area
under the marginal-revenue curve (MR). The pre-innovation profits are
represented by the area under the MR curve down to the initial cost curve
cl. The post-innovation profits are represented by the area under the MR
curve down to the post-innovation cost curve c2. The increment to the
monopolist’s profits from the innovation thus are represented in the
diagram by the area under the MR curve between the two cost curves c1
and c2. This way of representing the increment to the monopolist’s profits
makes it easy to show Arrow’s point graphically. When the monopolist
innovates, it can capture additional profits represented by the area
between c1 and c2 that lies under the MR curve. But when a competitor
firm innovates, it can capture additional profits represented by the area
between c1 and c2 all the way out to the pre-innovation competitive output
of xc1.31
The preexisting technology—represented here by c1—constrains the
royalty that the patentee is able to charge. Improvements can range in
significance all the way from one that approaches (but does not reach) the
cost-savings of a pioneer invention to the probably more common
inventions that generate modest cost savings. In the context in which we
have so far directed our attention, that of linear demand and constant
costs, all improvement-type inventions generate a lower ratio of
deadweight loss to profit (and to total surplus) than do pioneer
inventions. Restated, within the context of linear demand and constant
cost, this class of inventions appears prima facie to generate a higher ratio
of social benefit to social cost than does the class of pioneer inventions.

31As

pointed out above, the competitive output remains at xc1 because the innovator
imposes a royalty for the newly developed technology equal to the unit cost savings.
Without the royalty, the competitive output would increase to xc2.
Arrow’s conclusion that a competitor firm possesses a greater incentive to innovate than
a monopolist rests upon an analysis that does not take account of how the incentives of a
competitor to innovate are affected by the presence of rivals who are also considering the
pros and cons of r&d activity. A secure incumbent monopolist (in the Arrow sense) need
not discount its likelihood of technical success by the probabilities of beating its rivals to
the patent office as must a competitor firm.
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B. The Kaplow Analysis.
In a path-breaking analysis of the patent system and its connections
to antitrust law, Harvard Professor Louis Kaplow brought a new
analytical refinement to the evaluation of the patent system and its
operation.32 Identifying the social benefits of the patent system as the
innovations that it engenders and the social costs of that system as the
monopoly output restrictions which the system provides as incentives for
innovative activity, Kaplow directed his attention to the system’s marginal
benefits and costs. As Kaplow rightly indicated, a rational society--after
determining the level of innovation that it desired--would wish to
generate that innovation at the least cost. Indeed, ideally society should
limit the patent term at the point when the marginal social costs imposed
by the patent system rise to the level of the marginal benefits that it
generates.
In trying to get a handle on the patent system’s marginal social
costs and benefits, Kaplow hypothesized a one-year extension of the
patent term. A one-year extension of the patent term would increase the
reward of the patent and thus would probably generate more innovations.
The additional innovations generated by that one-year extension would
constitute the marginal benefit of such an extension. But a one-year
extension of the patent term would also impose additional social costs.
That one-year extension would mean that all of the patent monopolies
which were about to expire now would continue for an additional year.
32Louis

(1984).

Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813

22

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. xx

That additional year extension thus would impose monopoly losses upon
society which society would not incur in the absence of the extension. The
monopoly loss so imposed during the one-year extension of the patent
term would be the incremental, i.e., marginal, cost of that one year
extension. Kaplow also worked backward to compare the costs and
benefits which would result from reducing the patent term: what would
be the social losses from the reduction in innovation which would result
from a one-year reduction of the patent term? And what would be the
social benefits (in the elimination of monopoly restrictions) which would
result from such a one-year reduction of the patent term?
Kaplow forthrightly acknowledged that it is virtually impossible to
determine either the value of new innovation or the monopoly loss from a
hypothetical extension of the patent term. He believed, however, that the
analytical format which he developed would be helpful in thinking about
the issues. His marginal analysis is a major contribution. Earlier writers
had not focused their attention on marginal costs and benefits. Kaplow’s
format, by forcing us to consider marginal costs and benefits, moves
analysis and evaluation of the operation of the patent system to a higher
plane of conceptual clarity.
C. A Simple (and Linear) Model
Let us now use this marginal analysis in assessing the operation of
the patent system. As Kaplow pointed out, when we protect an inventor’s
work for more years than would be necessary to stimulate his invention,
we impose a cost upon society in the form of a restricted output. Thus
some inventions upon which patents are granted would have been
produced, even without a stimulus from the patent system. For other
inventions, the costs of research and development, the risks of failure and
the risks of the marketplace would deter the necessary innovative effort
without the stimulus of an exclusivity period provided by the patent
system. Yet for some inventions, the necessary period of exclusivity might
be very short. The stimulus necessary to generate other inventions might
be longer, but still less than the actual patent term. For yet other
inventions, exclusivity for the full patent term would be necessary to
provide an adequate stimulus. Other potential inventions may well go
uninvented because even the 20-year patent term is too short to provide
the requisite incentive.
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Figure 3
Let’s begin our analysis by assuming that some inventions would
be produced without any period of exclusivity, some would be produced
with a one year period, others with a two-year period, others with a three
year period, etc. Thus we will assume that each year of the patent term
produces an incremental stimulus to generate more inventions. More
precisely, we assume that invention occurs in proportion to the
investment in research and development (r&d). On these assumptions,
more investment in r&d generates increased invention and the increase in
invention is proportional to the increase in r&d investment. For purposes
of the following discussion, invention is measured in terms of a value
derived from the market: Inventions carry value determined by the
demand for a patented invention, a value derived from its attractiveness
as a consumption good or from its ability to produce new products or to
lower production costs for preexisting products.
Let us assume that each year of the patent term provides the
incremental incentive necessary to generate new inventions, over and
above the inventions generated by terms of lesser length. For purposes of
exposition, we hypothesize that each year of the patent term generates
such additional inventions that (in an unrestricted market) would
generate an average of $1,000,000,000 per year over their useful lives.
Note, however, that because these inventions will be covered by patents,
their output will be restricted during the patent term. For the reasons set
forth below, the annual value represented by these inventions during the
patent term will be assumed to be 75% of the amount that it would be in
an (unrestricted) competitive market. The monopoly restriction and
concomitant social loss imposed by the patentee thus is assumed to be
equal to 25% of the social value in a competitive market. Social value is the
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combination of producer and consumer surplus.
Figure 3 above represents the demand for a pioneer invention. The
annual value that would be contributed by the production of the product
in a competitive market is symbolized by the area DFG. We assume that
the product is patented, however, so that the patentee restricts production
to X, producing producer surplus represented by the rectangle EABF, and
a concomitant consumer surplus DAE. The aggregate social value of the
product is thus represented by the area DABF, the monopoly loss being
the area AGB. Assuming a linear demand33 for the product and constant
costs as in figure 4, the monopoly loss is 25% of the total area DFG. (The
triangle AGB is equal to the triangle DAE and is one half the area of the
rectangle EABF.)
Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

PS
(annual)
$250
$250
$250
$250
$250
$250
$250
$250
$250
$250
$250
$250
$250
$250
$250
$250
$250
$250
$250
$250

CS+PS
(annual)
$750
$750
$750
$750
$750
$750
$750
$750
$750
$750
$750
$750
$750
$750
$750
$750
$750
$750
$750
$750

Monopoly loss Value of
(annual)
invention
$250
$9,000
$250
$9,000
$250
$9,000
$250
$9,000
$250
$9,000
$250
$9,000
$250
$9,000
$250
$9,000
$250
$9,000
$250
$9,000
$250
$9,000
$250
$9,000
$250
$9,000
$250
$9,000
$250
$9,000
$250
$9,000
$250
$9,000
$250
$9,000
$250
$9,000
$250
$9,000

Marginal
Benefit
$9,000
$9,000
$9,000
$9,000
$9,000
$9,000
$9,000
$9,000
$9,000
$9,000
$9,000
$9,000
$9,000
$9,000
$9,000
$9,000
$9,000
$9,000
$9,000
$9,000

Marginal
Cost
$250
$500
$750
$1,000
$1,250
$1,500
$1,750
$2,000
$2,250
$2,500
$2,750
$3,000
$3,250
$3,500
$3,750
$4,000
$4,250
$4,500
$4,750
$5,000

Table 1
[figures in millions of dollars]
33

The paper employs a linear model as an entry into its analysis of the patentee’s
situation. The use of linear analyses is common in other critiques of the patent system.
See, e.g. Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 127, 162-68
(2003); Douglas Gary Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government Should Subsidize the
Purchase of Patented Pharmaceuticals, 11 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 123, 130 (1997). Later, this
assumption is dropped. See text at note 38 infra.
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In table 1 above, we consider marginal social costs and benefits
using the approach just outlined and add a number of additional
assumptions. First, we continue the assumption that each year of the
patent term generates new inventions whose production under
competitive conditions would add $1,000,000,000 of social value (i.e.,
producer surplus plus consumer surplus) to the economy. And because
these new inventions are patented, we continue to assume that the
patentees impose monopoly restrictions on production, thus reducing the
$1,000,000,000 of potential social benefit by 25% to $750,000,000. Next, we
determine how to capitalize the social value of inventions. Here we make
two observations. First, during the 20-year patent term, the social value is
the discounted sum of the combination of producer and consumer
surplus. But the social value of the invention continues beyond the end of
the patent term. After the patent term the social value is the discounted
sum of each year’s consumer surplus (that is now enlarged when the
patent rights expire). Together, these two sums equal the capitalized value
of the consumer surplus unrestricted by the exercise of patent rights.
Using a 5% discount rate, the value of the inventions generated by each
year of patent protection would thus be 20 times earnings, or
$20,000,000,000.
Alternatively, we could take a more conservative approach by
drawing from the practice of investors in the securities markets.
Historically, a conservative measure for the value of a stock was twelve
times the annual per share earnings of the company.34 Following our
conservative approach, we capitalize only the combination of producer
and consumer surplus (omitting the deadweight loss). Thus we multiply
the $750,000,000 (producer plus consumer surplus) by twelve, to arrive at
a capitalized social benefit of $9,000,000,000. We use this figure for social
value in the analysis in table 1 above.
On these assumptions, the patent restrictions applied to the
inventions which would have been produced in the absence of the patent
system produce unnecessary restrictions on those inventions for 20 years.
For inventions which would have been stimulated with only a one-year
patent term, the actual patent term produces unnecessary restrictions for
19 years. For inventions which would have been stimulated with only a

34Investors

capitalize producer surplus. Since we are concerned with social value, we
capitalize the combination of producer and consumer surplus but exclude the
deadweight loss.
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two-year patent term, the actual patent term produces unnecessary
restrictions for 18 years. Thus each year of the patent term adds
restrictions on the output of a new class of inventions--i.e., those for
whose generation a patent term ending a year earlier would have been
sufficient--to the restrictions imposed by earlier years. The marginal social
costs of patent restrictions thus rise with each year of the patent term.
We start with the most simple assumptions. Later, we will add
some more complexity. Table 1 is based upon the assumption that each
year of the patent term generates inventions whose aggregate capitalized
value is nine billion dollars. On that assumption, the marginal benefit
from each year of the patent term is a constant $9 billion. The marginal
costs of the patent system, on these assumptions, gradually rise from $250
million to $5 billion. On such assumptions the patent term would have to
be lengthened to 36 years before its marginal cost would rise to the level
of its marginal benefits. If the patent system actually operates like the one
hypothesized, there would be little room for concern that the patent term
was unduly long.
I suspect that for a range each year of the patent term generates an
increasing marginal return.35 If so, over that range marginal benefit would
be substantially outpacing marginal cost under the above assumptions,
because new inventions would be adding their capitalized values to the
computation of the marginal benefit, substantially outpacing growth in
the aggregate monopoly restrictions. Ultimately, however, decreasing
returns would be likely set in. And, of course, a rapid shrinkage of
marginal benefit after a rapid rise would maximize the chances that
marginal cost would then meet marginal benefit.
D. Ex Post and Ex Ante Values
Note that the monopoly restriction impacts society now, at the time
that the output restriction occurs. The monopoly restriction is properly
measured, therefore, in the present, at its full nominal dollar amount. Yet
that monopoly restriction engenders an incentive to innovation only at its
ex ante value. As the patent term increases in length, the difference
35

Nordhaus appears to have assumed continually diminishing marginal returns to
research investment. See Nordhaus, supra note 5 at 23, 73-75. Professor F. M. Scherer,
commenting on Nordhaus, believes that it is more plausible to assume increasing returns
to research, followed by decreasing returns. F.M. Scherer, Nordhaus’ Theory of Optimal
Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 422 (1972).
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between the dead weight loss (measured ex post) and the incentive effect
(measured ex ante) grows.
Thus, as we observed in part I, the ex ante value to the patentee of
each additional year of the patent term declines over the life of the patent.
This is the necessary result of discounting future returns to their present
values. Because the ex ante value of the return generated by each year of
the patent term declines each year of that term, then on our assumptions
(all other factors remaining the same) the incentive effect of the patent
term increases at a declining rate over the patent term. Each year of patent
protection generates a lesser incentive to inventive activity than did the
year preceding it.
Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

CS+PS Monopoly loss
Value
(annual)
of invention
$750
$250
$9,000
$713
$238
$8,550
$683
$228
$8,190
$645
$215
$7,740
$615
$205
$7,380
$585
$195
$7,020
$563
$188
$6,750
$533
$178
$6,390
$510
$170
$6,120
$480
$160
$5,760
$458
$153
$5,490
$435
$145
$5,220
$420
$140
$5,040
$398
$133
$4,770
$383
$128
$4,590
$360
$120
$4,320
$345
$115
$4,140
$330
$110
$3,960
$315
$105
$3,780
$300
$100
$3,600

Marginal Social Benefits and Costs
Marginal Marginal Net Marginal
Benefit
Cost
Benefit
$9,000
$250
$8,750
$8,550
$488
$8,063
$8,190
$715
$7,475
$7,740
$930
$6,810
$7,380
$1,135
$6,245
$7,020
$1,330
$5,690
$6,750
$1,518
$5,232
$6,390
$1,695
$4,695
$6,120
$1,865
$4,255
$5,760
$2,025
$3,735
$5,490
$2,178
$3,313
$5,220
$2,323
$2,898
$5,040
$2,463
$2,578
$4,770
$2,595
$2,175
$4,590
$2,723
$1,868
$4,320
$2,843
$1,478
$4,140
$2,958
$1,183
$3,960
$3,068
$893
$3,780
$3,173
$608
$3,600
$3,273
$328

Table 2

These considerations require that we modify the analysis in Part III. There
it was assumed that each year of the patent term generates a constant
amount of innovation. We now modify that analysis by discounting future
returns to present values. This modification now requires us to take
account of the fact that throughout the patent term, each year of patent
protection generates a progressively smaller increment to the incentive to
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inventive activity.
In order to discount future returns to present values, we need first
to determine the discount rate. In the following example, the discount rate
chosen is 5%. Let’s consider an invention that generates an income stream
of one dollar per year for the twenty-year patent term. Discounted to
present value at the 5% rate, the income for each year falls from $1.00 in
the first year to $.95 in the second year to $ .91 for the third year, and
ultimately to $.40 for the twentieth year. Since a dollar of expected
revenue from each year of the patent term has a present value of less than
the present value of a dollar from the year preceding, we assume that the
second year of patent protection generates a lesser incentive to invest in
research and development than the first year. The third year generates a
still lesser incentive, and so on. On this reasoning, the second, third and
subsequent years generate incentives of 95%, 91%, 86%, 82%, 78%, 75%,
71%, 68%, 64%, 61%, 58%, 56%, 53%, 51%, 48%, 46%, 44%, 42% and 40% of
the incentive generated by the first year revenues. Accordingly, in the
following example, we assume that each of the years of the patent term
provokes investment that declines in these proportions. The figures in the
invention “value” column therefore are also adjusted downwards to
reflect the lesser inventive activity. If the assumptions underlying table 2
accurately reflected reality, then the patent term would be almost optimal.
One additional year would bring the patent term to its optimal. Beyond
that, additional years would produce negative net social values.
E. Making the Model More Complex
1. Modifying the “Constant Cost” Assumption
Let’s first consider dropping the constant-cost assumption
employed in the preceding analysis. When marginal cost is rising, it
intersects the demand curve sooner than when marginal cost is constant.
Thus, in cases involving pioneer inventions in which marginal cost is
rising, the dead weight loss will be less than the 25% of potential benefits
of the invention assumed above in sections C and D of this Part IV. Of
course, a declining marginal cost curve produces the opposite effect. A
monopoly restriction in a situation of declining marginal cost produces a
greater dead weight loss than in the situation of constant marginal costs.
Yet economists commonly assume that a firm’s short-run marginal cost
curve eventually rises, because in the short run the firm is unable to adjust
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the proportions at which it deploys capital with labor. As a result, its
short-run marginal-cost curve takes on a U-shape.36 Moreover, a firm
with a constantly declining marginal cost curve appears to be a natural
monopoly.37 Since our focus is upon output restrictions that are generated
by patents (rather than other causes), natural monopolies fall outside the
domain of this paper. On the basis of these considerations, it seems
appropriate now to let marginal costs either rise or remain constant. For
ease of statement, let’s assume that the aggregate yearly output produced
under pioneer patents is produced by firms whose marginal cost curve is
either flat or U-shaped.
If, for each year, most of the output value produced under pioneer
patents is produced by firms with flat or U-shaped marginal cost curves,
then analysis presented in sections C and D above requires adjustment.
While production under conditions of flat (or constant) marginal cost and
linear demand would generate the results set forth above, production
under U-shaped marginal cost curves would generate lesser deadweight
loss. Thus allowing production under the latter conditions into the model
would increase the ratio between social benefit and social cost.
2. Including Improvement and Component Inventions
The ratio of social benefit to deadweight loss is higher in
improvement inventions than in pioneer inventions. Indeed, the ratio
appears to grow as the cost savings generated by the invention falls. The
highest ratio of social benefit to deadweight loss is associated with modest
cost improvements and the lowest ratios with inventions that approach
the cost saving magnitude of a pioneer invention. Since the number of
commercially valuable improvement inventions probably vastly exceeds
the number of pioneer inventions, the linear model would be made
somewhat more realistic by adjusting it to include improvement and
component inventions. The result of this modification would necessarily
increase the overall ratio of social benefit to deadweight loss generated by
the patent system.
It follows that under conditions of linear demand, the ratio between
marginal social benefit and marginal social cost appears to be greater than
36

See, e.g., ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 224, 226 (5th ed.
2001)
37 Id., at 350.
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the three to one ratio considered in section D. The larger ratio is due both
to the addition of improvement patents to the universe of pioneer patents
first considered and to the addition of production processes involving
ultimately rising (or U-shaped) marginal cost curves.

3. Dropping the Assumption of Linear Demand
Let’s now drop the assumption that the demand curve is linear.
Some of the current legal literature employs linear assumptions,38 but
those assumptions oversimplify reality. Probably most actual demand
curves exhibit significant concavity. This would likely be true especially
where the product in question appealed to a broad public and, as price
dropped, became available to lower-income segments of the public.
Dropping the preceding assumption of linearity, of course, substantially
complicates our evaluation of the patent system’s social benefits and costs.
Nonlinear curves come in an endless variety of shapes and positions. In
addition, there is no reason to believe that all actual demand curves are
continuous rather than kinked, or indeed wrinkled, broken, or otherwise
discontinuous. But bringing nonlinear demand curves into the analysis is
absolutely necessary, since there is no reason to believe that actual
demand curves are linear. Moreover, broadening the model may heighten
our appreciation of both social problems connected with the patent system
and their potential solutions. Let’s take a few examples to see whether we
can learn anything from them.
Many simple concave demand curves are of the form a constant
over x raised to a power. Curves of this form exhibit unitary elasticity
throughout their length where the exponent of x is one; inelasticity where
the exponent is greater than one and elasticity where the exponent is less
than one. Since monopolists maximize their profits by pricing in the elastic
portions of their demand curves, demand curves of the form of k/x2 (or
k/x3, k/x4, etc.) do not appear interesting in a pure form, because they
exhibit inelasticity throughout their length. If we add a (second) constant,
however, so that the curve is of the form k1/x2 + k2, the curve becomes
elastic at higher values of x and is asymptotic to k2. An interesting aspect
of this curve is that the associated marginal revenue curve rises
38

See, e.g. Abramowicz, supra note 33, at 62
- 68, criticizing Lichtman, supra note 33, at 130
(1997). Lichtman, however, recognizes the critical role that his assumptions play in his analysis.
Lichtman, supra, at 130.
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throughout. As a result, a constant marginal cost is initially higher than
marginal revenue. If it is higher than the asymptote, it will never intersect
with the marginal revenue curve; marginal cost would exceed marginal
revenue at every level of output; and as a result there would be no output.
But if a constant marginal-cost curve is lower than the asymptote, it will
eventually intersect with the rising marginal-revenue curve.39 Beyond that
point, marginal revenue will exceed marginal cost for all levels of output.
In such a situation, there would be no monopoly restriction on output; a
monopolist in this situation would produce to capacity. A curve of this
type is illustrated in figure 4 below.

Figure 4
Now let’s take a demand curve of the form of a constant over the
square (or other) root of x. In figure 5 below, the demand curve is this
form and the exponent is one/half, i.e., the curve takes the form of a
constant over the square root of x (k/ox or kx-1/2). The marginal revenue
curve corresponding to such a demand curve takes the form of k/2ox or
kx-1/2/2.

39

A U-shaped marginal cost curve would, of course, also intersect with a rising marginal
cost curve.
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Figure 5
In the circumstances illustrated by figure 5, a pioneer inventor would
favor a price/output policy determined by the intersection of its marginal
cost and marginal revenue curves at point E. It would produce Xm units of
output and sell them at price P. It would earn a profit represented by the
area P-MC-E-A and the resulting deadweight loss would be represented
by the area under the demand curve from A to B down to the marginal
cost curve MC-E-B.
In this circumstance, i.e., with a demand curve of the form k/ox, it
turns out that the deadweight loss is exactly equal to the seller’s profits.
The patent restriction thus appears more significant than it did in the case
where we assumed that the demand curve took a linear form. In the
former case the deadweight loss was only one half of the profits. Here it is
equal to the entire amount of the profits. Still, the combination of profits
and consumer surplus exceeds the deadweight loss. Let’s call that
combination of profits and consumer surplus total surplus for ease of
presentation. Downward shifts in the cost curve would increase total
surplus and (since profit equals deadweight loss) would necessarily
increase the absolute amount by which total surplus exceeds deadweight
loss.
The earlier projections of the balance between the social benefits
and costs of the patent system made under assumptions of linear demand
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do not fit these demand curves which exhibit elasticity throughout. The
demand curves in this example (of the form of a constant over the square
root of x) alter the ratio between benefits and costs. Inventions for which
the demand takes this form would appear overall to generate higher social
costs than under the earlier analysis involving linear demands. Moreover,
other demand curves of the same form but involving numerically higher
denominators (such as the curve generated by a constant over the square
root of 2x or k/o2x) produce an even higher ratio of deadweight loss to
profit. Indeed, the curve of the form k/o2x follows the basic form of k/ox
but it is located further to the left, thereby further reducing profit in
relation to deadweight loss, so that the deadweight loss produced by
monopoly pricing under such a demand is actually larger than profit.
Curves in the form of k/3ox (kx-1/3) or variations on them or those
involving smaller negative exponents would generate even higher ratios
of deadweight loss to profit. In short, the introduction of nonlinear
demands shows that the potential deadweight loss generated by the
patent system could be very large indeed.
4. Recapitulation and Assessment.
Let’s pause to recapitulate. When we examined the social costs and
benefits of a patent system under our first set of highly simplified
assumptions (i.e., all patentees possessed monopoly power and all
demands were linear), we found that deadweight loss was limited to an
amount equal to one-half of profit and one-third of total surplus. When
we broadened that model to include improvement patents, we found that
the ratio of deadweight loss to social benefit would be reduced. When we
examined concave demands, we found that demand curves of the form of
k1/x2 + k2 would not generate any deadweight loss at all: either there
would be no output (because marginal cost exceeded marginal revenue at
all levels of output) or there would be output but no monopoly restriction
(because marginal revenue would eventually exceed marginal cost
throughout the range of possible production). Yet demand curves of
different shapes produced an opposite result: When we examined concave
demand curves of the form of k/ox, we found that deadweight loss was
larger in relation to total surplus than under linear demands and that
under many variations of that form of demand curve deadweight loss
would actually exceed profit.
This examination of some of the possible shapes of demand curves
thus reveals several matters: First, some types of demand curves
(including both linear and some nonlinear) generate high ratios of positive
welfare effects to deadweight losses. Second, there are some types of
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demand curves (e.g., k1/x + k2) that are incompatible with monopoly
restrictions. Third, still other types of demand curves (e.g., k/ox ) would
provide the context for a single-price monopolist to generate very large
deadweight losses. Fourth, improvement-type patents generate a lower
ratio of deadweight loss to profit under any type of demand curve; and
they are likely to generate a lower ratio of deadweight loss to aggregate
welfare (total surplus) so long as the production volume preceding the
introduction of the improvement was sufficiently large.
Let’s identify the significance of these matters for policymaking. In
categories of patented inventions producing high ratios of deadweight
loss to welfare (total surplus), marginal social cost meets marginal social
benefit earlier than in those categories where the opposite is the case. A
policy prescription seems to follow: Provide shorter patent terms for
inventions with the highest ratios of deadweight loss and longer terms for
inventions with lower ratios of deadweight loss. One problem that we
face, however, is that while we may be able to make some judgments
about how to set relative lengths of patent terms among classes of
invention, we do not possess a baseline from which to set these relative
terms. There is, moreover, a second problem with such a policy
prescription that is discussed below. What do we know about the
categories of invention that are likely to generate the highest ratios of
deadweight loss to welfare?
The category of invention that is likely to produce the highest ratio
of deadweight loss to welfare is likely to be a pioneer invention, as we
have defined it. Thus it is a stand-alone product, rather than a component
or improvement. It is likely to be a product that is desired by many people
but one that many are unable or unwilling to pay the monopoly price set
by the patentee. In short, the demand for the product is a highly elastic
one. The demand curve may well be kinked below the monopoly price
where it becomes highly elastic. Some pharmaceutical products are likely
to meet this description.
In our discussion of patentee pricing producing high ratios of
deadweight loss to welfare, we have been assuming that patentees set
price at a single level for all purchasers. Thus our analysis has been
focused upon the deadweight loss produced by a single-price monopolist.
Yet is in exactly the circumstances that we have identified as giving rise to
high ratios of deadweight loss to welfare that a monopolist has the
greatest incentive to set a range of prices, each price geared to a different
market segment. Price discrimination by a patentee is discussed below.
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Here it is relevant merely to point out that patentees that are able to price
discriminate among market segments may substantially reduce the
deadweight losses that they would otherwise generate. The argument
referred to above for reducing the patent terms of certain pioneer
inventions, therefore, would not apply to these price-discriminating
patentees.

V. PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND ITS BENEFITS
A. In General
Deadweight loss falls as output increases beyond the single-price
monopoly output. Such increases in output can result from price
discrimination. Economists recognize that price discrimination carries the
potential for increasing output in monopoly markets.40 A monopolist that
practices so-called first-degree price discrimination (i.e., selling to each
customer at the customer’s reservation price41) would expand output until
all customers with reservation prices above marginal cost were satisfied.
In such a situation, output would be at the competitive level and there
would be no deadweight loss.42 In so-called third-degree price
discrimination, a monopolist sells at its most profitable price to each of
several segmented markets. It maximizes its profits when its marginal
revenues from each market are the same and are equal to its marginal
cost.43 First-degree price discrimination always increases output. Thirddegree price discrimination maximizes output when the demand curve in
the more elastic market exhibits a greater concavity (viewed from above)
than the demand curve in the less elastic market.44
We have observed above that a monopolist’s
discriminate increases as the deadweight loss from
pricing increases. Since price discrimination carries
expanding output and reducing deadweight loss
40

incentive to price
monopoly singlethe potential for
when there are

See, e.g,, ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 372-74 (5th ed.
2001); F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE & MARKET PERFORMANCE 49496 (3d ed. 1990).
41 A reservation price is the highest price that a customer would be willing to pay for the
product.
42 SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 40 at 495.
43 PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 40 at 377.
44 SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 40 at 496.
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substantial differences in the elasticities among markets, a patent policy
that encouraged price discrimination in those circumstances would
possess considerable social merit. Because patent policy is probably too
crude an instrument to take into account differences in demand elasticity,
a socially optimum patent policy would just endorse all price
discrimination by patentees.
B. Discrimination in the Domestic Market
Despite its merits, price discrimination has not always been looked
upon favorably in the United States and other nations.45 In 1914, Congress
directed section two of the Clayton Act against price discrimination that
was being employed predatorily by large firms to drive their rivals from
the market.46 Later, in 1936, Congress expanded section 2 in the RobinsonPatman Act47 in order to protect small retailers from aggressive pricecutting by chain stores who were able to secure their supplies at
discriminatorily-favorable prices. In a series of legislative acts extending
from 1916 to the present, Congress has sought to prevent or constrain
“dumping” which is, in effect, price discrimination on an international
scale.48 Yet price discrimination is a way for a seller possessing market
power both to increase its own profits as well as (under the conditions
identified above) to mute the anti-social effects of its power by expanding
its own output and concomitantly reducing deadweight loss. Price
discrimination is widely practiced in the United States in a variety of
forms.49
As pointed out above, the welfare loss from monopoly pricing is
generally at its highest when the monopolist sells to all customers at a
45

Two provisions of European Union competition law are directed against price
discrimination. Article 81(1)(d) of the Treaty of Rome identifies agreements that “apply
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby
placing them at a competitive disadvantage” as particularly suspect. Similarly Article
82(c) identifies the application of dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions by a
dominant firm as behavior which constitutes an abuse of its position.
46 Clayton Antitrust Act, 38 Stat. 730, ch. 323, § 2 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 13-13b, 21a (2000).
47 Robinson-Patman Act, ch. 592, §§ 1-4, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1313b, 21a (2000)).
48 Antidumping Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 801, 39 Stat. 798 (1916), Antidumping Act of 1921,
ch. 14 § 201, 42 Stat. 11 (1921); Trade Act of 1974, § 321, Pub. L. no. 93-618, 88 Stat. 2043
(1974); Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 92 Stat. 162 (1979).
49 PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 36 at 376.
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single price. This welfare loss is aggravated where the ratio between
deadweight loss and profit is high. Yet, if the monopolist were able to sell
to different segments of demand at prices geared to those segments, that
welfare loss might well be significantly reduced. Let’s take a look at the
pricing of pharmaceutical products.
To a significant degree price discrimination now appears to reduce
deadweight loss in pharmaceuticals within the United States domestic
market. Indeed, even at a time when price discrimination was most
disfavored, Congress recognized its potential for good. Within two years
after it enacted the Robinson-Patman Act to protect small business firms
from large-chain-store competition, Congress enacted the Nonprofit
Institutions Act in order to ensure the legality of price discrimination in
favor of nonprofit institutions.50 A major channel of distribution of
pharmaceutical products involves so-called “closed door” sales to
hospitals and other health-care institutions for the use of their patients.51
In addition, pharmaceuticals are sold for a variety of prices to, or under
arrangements with, wholesale drug chains, health maintenance
organizations, and insurance companies.52 A wide variety of theorists
have viewed bargaining by these and similar organizations as a route for
driving down pharmaceutical prices.
C. Discrimination in the Global Markets
On the international marketplace, prices often vary substantially
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and this price variation (or
discrimination) may reduce global deadweight loss. Indeed, prices of
pharmaceutical products vary widely, for example, among the nations in
North America and among the nations in Europe. Recent proposals to
alleviate perceived high pharmaceutical prices in the United States by
allowing purchases of pharmaceuticals in Canada for use within the
United States have drawn attention to different pricing in different
50

15 U.S.C. § 13c (2000). The Supreme Court has nonetheless held the Robinson-Patman
Act applicable to purchases by state agencies for resale in competition with retail
pharmacists. Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass’n v. Abbot Laboratories, 460 U.S. 150,
171 (1983).
51 Dennis S. Corgill, Distributing Products Under the Nonprofit Institutions Act: Price
Discrimination, Arbitrage, and Fraud in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 2001 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1383,
1394-95 (2001).
52 See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, 186 F.3d 781, 783
(7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Ferro, 252 F.3d 964, 967 (8th Cir. 2001).
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national markets.53 Pharmaceutical prices are lower in Canada than in the
United States because Canada exerts control over their pricing through its
Patented Medicine Prices Review Board.54 Pharmaceutical prices in the
United Kingdom are generally lower than in Germany and the
Netherlands, because the U.K. government maintains an effective ceiling
on their prices. Indeed, government policies on controlling
pharmaceutical prices have varied substantially over the years within the
European Union, giving rise to widespread arbitrage.55
Keying prices of pharmaceuticals to market demand in different
national marketplaces would appear to be a means of both increasing the
availability of these products to people that need them and to increase the
profits of the pharmaceutical companies. The most obvious impediments
to this approach are (1) the possibility of arbitrage diverting discounted
products back to Western markets and undercutting Western prices; and
(2) engendering resistance to Western pharmaceutical prices as knowledge
of the discount prices provided to third-world countries spreads in the
West.56
D. Encouraging Price Discrimination in Global Markets
It is in the economic interest of pharmaceutical manufacturers to
sell their products in ways that maximize their profits. And price
discrimination may further that goal. As we observed above, as the
deadweight loss increases relative to the single monopoly price, price
discrimination becomes ever more attractive to the seller and is likely to

See, e.g., A. Bryan Baer, Price Controls Through the Back Door: The Parallel Importation of
Pharmaceuticals, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 109, 109-10 (2001).
54 Patent Act, R.S.C., c. P-4 (1985)., as amended. See, e.g., Michele L. Creech, Make a Run
for the Border: Why the United States Government is Looking to the International Market for
Affordable Prescription Drugs, 15 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 593, 615 (2001) (discussing the
Canadian Patented Medicine Prices Review Board); Patricia I Carter, Federal Regulation of
Pharmaceuticals in the United States and Canada, 21 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 215, 245-49
(1999) (same).
55 Merk v. Primecrown Ltd., (C-267/95 & 268/95) [1996] E.C.R. 6285; Merk & Co. v.
Stephar BV (187/80) [1981] E.C.R. 2063; Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug Inc., (15/74)
[1974] E.C.R. 1147.
56 Bess-Carolina Dolmo, Examining Global Access to Essential Pharmaceuticals in the Face of
Patent Protection Rights: the South African Example, 7 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 137, 155
(2001) (comparing the Italian price of Fluconazole of $23.50 with the Indian price of $.95)
(student note).
53
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significantly reduce the social loss that results from a monopolistically-set
single price.
Similar issues are present on the international marketplace. Large
variations in wealth between the developed, developing and
underdeveloped nations means that there are vast disparities in the
purchasing powers of their publics. Pharmaceutical companies could
benefit if they were capable of selling at a range of prices keyed to each
sector of demand.57 A major impediment to the implementation of such a
program, however, is the potential for arbitrage. In Europe, where
governmental interventions in markets have forced prices to
comparatively low levels in certain national markets, arbitrageurs have
seized the opportunities of purchasing in the low-priced markets and
exporting into high-priced markets.58 Probably a major impediment to
pharmaceutical companies selling at low prices in the underdeveloped or
developing world is the potential for arbitrage that such sales would
engender. Arbitrageurs would be likely to purchase at third-world prices
for re-export to the West for sale at North American or European prices.
Many commentators interested in increasing the availability of
pharmaceuticals to third-world nations, have directed their attention to
the problem of potential arbitrage, and to the potential for arbitrage to
discourage low-price sales in third-world nations.59 Most of these
commentators have focused their attention on the impact of the first-sale
or exhaustion doctrine and on how a doctrine of international exhaustion
would facilitate arbitrage. They have also directed their attention to
provisions of the World Trade Organization Agreement that prevent (or
appears to prevent) governments from interfering with arbitrage
operations. They have argued that that in order to effectively prevent
arbitrage in such situations, governments must be enlisted in the task.
Purely contractual restrictions between the exporting pharmaceutical
company and its third-world customer may be inadequate, these critics
have contended
, to provide the needed protection. Even the customs
service or health ministries of third-world nations may not be up to the
57

Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières) reports on its web site that it has
persuaded many pharmaceutical companies to sell at discount prices in third-world
markets. See its report on current accomplishments at http://www.Doctorswith
outborders.org/.
58 See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
59 See, e.g., Amir Attaran, The DOHA Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
Access to Pharmaceuticals, and Options under WTO Law, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 859, 879-80 (2002)
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task.60 Rather, according to these commentators, what is needed is multigovernmental cooperation: cooperation that involves the governments of
the exporting nation, the importing nation and the governments of all the
nations that are potential recipients of re-exports.
To what extent does the WTO regime impede arrangements that
might otherwise facilitate the delivery of patented pharmaceuticals to
third-world nations? This question cannot be answered without
considering both the text of the Treaty, the Doha Declaration, and related
developments. Considered by itself, the WTO does appear to bar the
cooperation among nations that could effectively prohibit arbitraging of
pharmaceutical products, as the critics have contended. Article XI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994) incorporated into
the World Trade Organization Agreement (WTO)61 prohibits any party to
the WTO Agreement from imposing quantitative restrictions on imports
or exports.62 Accordingly, a simple reading of the literal language of
Article XI would, as those commentators have suggested, appear to
prohibit inter-governmental cooperation designed to prohibit the export
of pharmaceuticals from poor nations or to bar their importation into
wealthier ones.63 Yet, there is much more to be said.
First, Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement permits governments to
impose compulsory licenses on patent holders in the case of a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency. At the time of the
anthrax scare in the United States, the U.S. government considered using
this power to compel licenses on Cipro, a patented antidote to anthrax,
Id., at 880.
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Done
at Marrakesh, April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1154 (1994) (Annex 1A: General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994)
62 See GATT 1994, Article IX:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges,
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or
other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting
party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other
contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product
destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
63 At least one commentator has also argued that discount sales to third-world markets
would be vulnerable to attack as dumping. See Attaran, supra note 59, at 882. As he
himself admits, however, the government of the recipient nation would be unlikely to
challenge low-priced sales that benefited its own citizens, at least when there was no
domestic pharmaceutical industry able to supply the domestic market and when other
equally low-priced sources of the product were unavailable.
60
61
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from Bayer, the German patentee.64 So did Canada.65 The HIV/AIDS and
other epidemics in third-world nations would appear to allow them to use
this Article 31 authority to impose compulsory licenses upon patented
pharmaceuticals that provided needed treatments.
Article 31, however, was drafted without consideration of the fact
that many poor nations lack pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity.
Compulsory licensing does not help when there are no potential domestic
manufacturing licensees. Accordingly, in November 2001, the ministers of
the WTO member states, meeting at Doha, issued the Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha Declaration).66 In this
Declaration, the ministers indicated that the TRIPS Agreement should be
construed to allow nations to import patented pharmaceuticals from
abroad to deal with national health emergencies, even though those
pharmaceuticals had not been produced with the permission of the
patentee. In other words, compulsory licensing would effectively extend
to suppliers from abroad when the nation experiencing the health
emergency lacked its own manufacturing capability. Since many of the
nations experiencing HIV/AIDS health emergencies lack their own
pharmaceutical manufacturing capability, the Doha Declaration was a
significant corrective to the unintended rigidity of the TRIPS language.
But the Doha Declaration also sheds light on the arbitraging issues
discussed in this paper.
In approving the use of compulsory licenses for foreign suppliers,
the ministers took steps to ensure that the entire production of the product
produced under those licenses would be applied to the national health
emergency and that none would be diverted to other markets. The
ministers mandated that “the entire output of the relevant
pharmaceuticals manufactured subject to the compulsory license should
be exported to the Member in need.” They indicated that the TRIPS
Council should be kept informed about “the nature and quantity of
pharmaceuticals being exported to a Member, the numbers of people
benefiting from the solution, and the results achieved, and any evidence of
diversion of products.” And, recognizing that “all Members should have
an obligation to ensure that the medicines in question are not diverted
David F. Fidler, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and International Law, 2002 CHI. J. INT’L L. 7,
21.
65 Susan K. Sell, TRIPS and Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 481, 515 (2002).
66 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 20 November 2001
64
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from the Member’s citizens for whom they were intended into other
countries,” they insisted upon “a commitment by all Members to take the
necessary steps to prevent diversion of the relevant pharmaceuticals.”
Second, it is not at all clear why contractual and licensing
restrictions would not afford a degree of protection against arbitrage. The
exporting pharmaceutical company could require, as a term of the sales
agreement, that the purchasing firms or other organizations in the
importing nation agree not to re-export and to take reasonable steps to
ensure that its distributees avoid re-export. It is also possible that patents
underlying these products could be employed as a base for licensing
restrictions that effectively barred re-export.
Third, patent law may, in some circumstances, provide assistance
in curbing or impeding arbitrage. Its usefulness depends in part upon the
patent exhaustion (or first-sale) doctrine, and how that doctrine is
implemented in the nations involved (or potentially involved) in
arbitrage. As that doctrine is reflected in U.S. law, a patentee exhausts its
rights over a particular unit of a patented product after it has sold that
unit.67 Thereafter the purchaser is generally free to resell that unit, as the
purchaser pleases. This doctrine is reflected in the patent law of most
other nations, producing similar results. But nations differ on how they
treat sales abroad. Some nations follow a doctrine of international
exhaustion, under which a sale anywhere in the world exhausts the rights
of the patent holder over the units sold. The purchaser is then free to resell
the product anywhere, including resales within the domestic market of
the patentee. Other nations limit their use of exhaustion to their domestic
markets. In these nations, a domestic sale would exhaust the patent
holder’s rights over units sold in the domestic market. But a sale abroad
would not give the purchaser a right to resell in the domestic market.
Until recently, U.S. courts have tended to apply exhaustion to unrestricted
sales abroad by a U.S. patentee or a party in privity with a U.S. patentee.68
Recently, however, the Federal Circuit has ruled that for exhaustion to
apply, “the authorized first sale must have occurred under the United
States patent,” a view that appears to embrace a domestic, rather than
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United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249 (1942) (“the authorized sale of an
article which is capable of use only in practicing the patent is a relinquishment of the
patent monopoly with respect to the article sold.”)
68 Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873); Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp. v.
United Aircraft Eng. Corp. , 266 Fed. 71 (2d Cir. 1920).
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international, view of exhaustion.69 Even under the traditional approach,
international exhaustion was of limited scope: Thus, when foreign sales of
a patented product sales have been conditioned upon their exclusion from
the United States, courts have barred their importation.70 In addition, the
cases have generally refused to apply international exhaustion to the
detriment of a rights-holder under a U.S. patent where the foreign sales
were made without the latter’s consent.71 The Federal Circuit, however,
has recently The European Union follows a policy under which sales
within any member state of the Union exhaust a patent holder’s rights.72
After such a sale, the units sold may be resold anywhere within the Union.
A sale outside of the Union, however, does not confer on the purchaser a
right to resell within the Union.73 Differentially-priced sales within
different member-states of the Union are vulnerable to arbitrage but it is
not clear whether low priced-sales of patented products outside the
European Union create a potential for export back into the Union. To the
extent that arbitrageurs sought to re-export pharmaceuticals to nations
that followed a doctrine of international exhaustion, patent law would not
provide a means for making such re-export unlawful. Although
commentators have focused considerable attention on the first-sale
doctrine and issues of international exhaustion, these legal issues are not
necessarily the key to preventing arbitrage.
Fourth, the patent law itself contemplates the imposition of
territorial limitations. While the law speaks to territorially limited
assignments of rights within the United States,74 it is clear that a patentee
may grant territorially limited licenses.75 Of course, once a licensee makes
a lawful and unconditional sale to a third party, the third party can deal
freely with the unit that it has purchased. If the sale takes place abroad,
then the ability of the third party to export to the United States raises
69
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suggestive of how EU authorities would treat interntional exhaustion issue involving
patent).
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issues of exhaustion. But if the patentee conditions the right of the licensee
to sell for use solely within the jurisdiction in which the licensee is located,
then a sale by the licensee not so conditioned does not convey unrestricted
title to the purchaser.
In a case in which a United States patentee delivers goods to a
distributor located in a particular third-world nation for distribution to
users within that nation, the legal analysis would be similar. Sales to the
distributor would be conditioned on resales to local users. Sales beyond
the mandate of the license would be unlawful, and would not confer firstsale rights on the purchaser.
Finally, a rather obvious means for a pharmaceutical company to
sell its products at low prices in a poor nation while impeding potential
arbitrage would be to limit the volume of sales to estimates of local
demand. The principal problem would lie in obtaining accurate estimates.
But the companies’ own marketing experiences both in the target market
and in other similar markets may prove helpful. In addition, governments
in the target markets would probably be willing to assist in the estimates
of local demand. In cases where the importer was a government or
government-controlled distributor, advance estimates of demand might
be unnecessary. In these cases, the governmental interest would lie in
ensuring that the purchased drugs would be routed to the patients who
needed them, and, in order to ensure the delivery of drugs in the future, to
take steps to discourage arbitrage. Patent law would support this scenario
indirectly, since by ensuring that the patentee is the only source of the
product, it ensures the effectiveness of the patentee’s limitation of its
export volume.
VI. CORRECTING THE WEAKNESSES OF THE PATENT SYSTEM
The most apparent weakness of the patent system in performing its
function of fostering invention lies in the deadweight losses that this
system generates. Generally, these deadweight losses are a modest price
for the encouragement of invention. Indeed, since there is no deadweight
loss at all without the development of both (i) a new product and (ii) one
for which there is a demand, these losses are a measure of technology
growth. To the extent that the exclusivity conferred on a patentee is
necessary to generate an invention, the resulting deadweight loss is not a
social loss at all. Yet, as discussed above, to the extent that the exclusivity
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is unnecessary (as, for example, by extending longer than necessary), it
can become a social cost.
The pharmaceutical industry provides an example where
deadweight losses may be large when measured on a global scale. Thus it
may be more of a candidate for revealing the weaknesses of the patent
system than other industries. It also may be the case that the usefulness of
the market in supplying information about needs to prospective inventors
is at its lowest in that part of this industry that is concerned with the
development of lifesaving products. It is a matter of common knowledge
that cures are needed for diseases afflicting large populations. Thus the
close interaction between the patent system and the pharmaceutical
industry may be less socially advantageous than in other industries: in
some parts of the pharmaceutical industry, market-based information is
less needed; and, in that industry, the patent system’s market-based
incentives carry a potential for generating unduly high deadweight
losses.76
These considerations raise the question of whether another form of
financing of the development of life-saving pharmaceutical products
would be desirable. Public funding of such development, if successful,
would generate the larger aggregate welfare, since there would be no
deadweight losses. But, to raise the question of public funding is also to
raise the question of who would ultimately pay for that public funding.
Well, that question, in turn, raises the question of who pays for the
76

The pharmaceutical industry also reveals other dysfunctions connected with the patent
system. As observed in the beginning of this article, prices of patented pharmaceuticals
reflect the exclusive rights that the patent system confers upon their patentees.
Consumers complain that these prices are unduly high, but exclusive patent rights are
designed to produce such prices. If those prices are high, that is the result that the patent
system contemplates. High prices generate the incentives necessary to stimulate
inventive activity. Yet when the government responds to consumer dissatisfaction by
subsidizing purchases of patented pharmaceuticals, the prices of these products will tend
to rise. Government subsidization of consumers increases demand and thus price. This
subsidy to consumers ultimately results in a subsidy to the pharmaceutical producers.
If, as is likely, the amended Medicare Act generates higher pharmaceutical prices in
the United States, the international problem is likely to be exacerbated unless the
patentees sell at discounted prices in poor countries. Purchasers in poor countries now
complain that they are priced out of the market. When U.S. prices rise further, the gap
between U.S. prices and affordable third-world prices will increase. As argued above,
however, the gap between U.S. and third-world prices need not deprive third-world
publics of patented pharmaceuticals, so long as the patentees are willing to set prices in
third-world markets targeted to the demand within each market.
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development of pharmaceutical products today. The answer to the latter
question is that although they are paid for by the publics of Western
nations, they bulk of the financial contribution comes from the American
public. Prices are higher in the United States than elsewhere. Moreover,
although the U.S. government does not pay list prices for pharmaceutical
products, it nonetheless subsidizes them in its Medicaid program and,
under recently enacted legislation, will now subsidize them in its
Medicare program. In short, the U.S. public (through purchase prices,
insurance premiums and/or taxes) pays a disproportionate part of the
research and development cost for new pharmaceutical products now.77
To raise the possibility of public funding for lifesaving
pharmaceutical products is also to raises the question of whether that
public funding should be shared by all or most of the world’s nations. The
entire world benefits, or potentially benefits, from pharmaceutical
research. Some formula, perhaps keyed to each nation’s gross domestic
product or to its per capita income might produce both a more equitably
shared source of financing and a major advance in global welfare. The
result, of course, would be that Western nations would make the largest
contributions. That part of the result mimics the present system in which
U.S. consumers pay the highest prices, Canadian and European
consumers pay lower prices and the lowest are paid by consumers in
those poor countries where the pharmaceutical companies sell at discount
prices. This financing arrangement, however, would have the advantage
of transparency, open bargaining, and an agreed-upon distribution of the
burden. The extent to which other Western nations free-ride upon U.S.
consumers’ support of research and development would probably fall.
The public funding of research would dispense with patent rights and the
deadweight losses that accompany their exercise. Global welfare would
advance substantially. Discontent in the third-world over patent policies
that prevented or impeded their publics from treatments available
elsewhere would be reduced. And a by-product of this reduced
discontent would be the strengthening of the Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS).
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